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I distinguish two types of macroeconomic models. The first type are top-down models in 
which some or all agents are capable of understanding the whole picture and use this superior 
information to determine their optimal plans. The second type are bottom-up models in which 
all agents experience cognitive limitations. As a result, these agents are only capable of 
understanding and using small bits of information. These are models in which agents use 
simple rules of behavior. These models are not devoid of rationality. Agents in these models 
behave rationally in that they are willing to learn from their mistakes.  
These two types of models produce a radically different macroeconomic dynamics. I analyze 
these differences. 
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In order to understand the nature of different macroeconomic models it is useful to 
make a distinction between top-down and bottom-up systems. In its most general 
definition a top-down system is one in which one or more agents fully understand the 
system. These agents are capable of representing the whole system in a blueprint that 
they can store in their mind. Depending on their position in the system they can use 
this blueprint to take over the command, or they can use it to optimize their own 
private welfare. These are systems in which there is a one to one mapping of the 
information embedded in the system and the information contained in the brain of one 
(or more) individuals. An example of such a top-down system is a building that can be 
represented by a blueprint and is fully understood by the architect.  
Bottom-up systems are very different in nature. These are systems in which no 
individual understands the whole picture. Each individual understands only a very 
small part of the whole. These systems function as a result of the application of simple 
rules by the individuals populating the system. Most living systems follow this 
bottom-up logic (see the beautiful description of the growth of the embryo by 
Dawkins(2009)). The market system is also a bottom-up system. The best description 
made of this bottom-up system is still the one made by Hayek(1945). Hayek argued 
that no individual exists who is capable of understanding the full complexity of a 
market system. Instead individuals only understand small bits of the total information. 
The main function of markets consists in aggregating this diverse information. If there 
were individuals capable of understanding the whole picture, we would not need 
markets. This was in fact Hayek’s criticism of the “socialist” economists who took the 
view that the central planner understood the whole picture, and would therefore be 
able to compute the whole set of optimal prices, making the market system 
superfluous. (For further insightful analysis see Leijonhufvud(1993)). 
My contention is that macroeconomic models that use the rational expectations 
assumption are the intellectual heirs of these central planning models. Not in the sense 
that individuals in these rational expectations models aim at planning the whole, but 
in the sense that, as the central planner, they understand the whole picture. Individuals 
in these rational expectations models are assumed to know and understand the 
complex structure of the economy and the statistical distribution of all the shocks that 
will hit the economy. These individuals then use this superior information to obtain 
  2the “optimum optimorum” for their own private welfare.  In this sense they are top-
down models.  
In this paper I will contrast the rational expectations top-down model with a bottom-
up macroeconomic model. This will be a model in which agents have cognitive 
limitations and do not understand the whole picture (the underlying model). Instead 
they only understand small bits and pieces of the whole model and use simple rules to 
guide their behavior. I will introduce rationality in the model through a selection 
mechanism in which agents evaluate the performance of the rule they are following 
and decide to switch or to stick to the rule depending on how well the rule performs 
relative to other rules.    
The modeling approach presented in this paper is not the only possible one to model 
agents’ behaviour under imperfect information. In fact, a large literature has emerged 
attempting to introduce imperfect information into macroeconomic models. These 
attempts have been based mainly on the statistical learning approach pioneered by 
Sargent(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja(2001). This literature leads to important 
new insights (see e.g. Gaspar and Smets(2006), Orphanides and Williams(2004), 
Milani(2007a), Branch and Evans(2009)). However, I feel that this approach still 
loads individual agents with too many cognitive skills that they probably do not 
posses in the real world
1.   
The purpose of this paper is to contrast the dynamics of the top-down and the bottom-
up models, and to draw some policy conclusions. The paper is very much inspired by 
the new literature on “agent-based macroeconomic models” (see Howitt(2008), 
Tesfatsion(2006),  LeBaron and Tesfatsion(2008) among others). Section 2 presents 
the bottom-up model, which will be called “behavioural model”. The next four 
sections then discuss the different implications the behavioural model has when 
contrasted with the rational expectations model. Section 7 presents some empirical 
evidence. The paper is concluded with a discussion of some methodological issues.  
   
  
                                                 
1 See the fascinating book of Gigerenzer and Todd(1999) on the use of simple heuristics as compared 
to statistical (regression) learning.  
  32. A behavioural macroeconomic model 
 
In this section the modeling strategy is described. This is done by presenting a 
standard aggregate-demand-aggregate supply model augmented with a Taylor rule. 
The novel feature of the model is that agents use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast 
the future. These rules are subjected to an adaptive learning mechanism, i.e., agents 
endogenously select the forecasting rules that have delivered the highest performance 
(“fitness”)  in the past. This selection mechanism acts as a disciplining device on the 
kind of rules that are acceptable. Since agents use different heuristics one obtains 
heterogeneity. This, as will be shown, creates endogenous business cycles.  
This behavioural model is contrasted with a similar model that incorporates rational 
expectations, and that is interpreted as a stylized version of DSGE-models. This 
comparison will make it possible to focus on some crucial differences in the 
transmission of shocks, in particular of monetary policy shocks. 
 
2.1 The model 
 
The model consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation 
and a Taylor rule.  
The aggregate demand equation is specified in the standard way, i.e.  
 
t t t t t t t t E r a y a y E a y            )
~
( ) 1 (
~
1 2 1 1 1 1    (1) 
 
where yt is the output gap in period t, rt is the nominal interest rate, t is the rate of 
inflation, and t is a white noise disturbance term.   t E
~
 is the expectations operator 
where the tilde above E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. This 
process will be specified subsequently.  I follow the procedure introduced in DSGE-
models of adding a lagged output in the demand equation. This is usually justified by 
invoking habit formation. I keep this assumption here as I want to compare the 
behavioural model with the DSGE-rational expectations model.  However, I will 
show in section 4 that I do not really need this inertia-building device to generate 
inertia in the endogenous variables.   
  4The aggregate supply equation can be derived from profit maximization of individual 
producers. As in DSGE-models a Calvo pricing rule and some indexation rule used in 
adjusting prices is assumed. This leads to a lagged inflation variable in the equation
2. 
The supply curve can also be interpreted as a New Keynesian Philips curve:    
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Finally the Taylor rule describes the behaviour of the central bank 
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where   is the inflation target which for the sake of convenience will be set equal to 
0. Note that, as is commonly done, the central bank is assumed to smooth the interest 
rate. This smoothing behaviour is represented by the lagged interest rate in equation 
(3). Ideally, the Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward looking inflation 
variable, i.e. central banks set the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts about the 
rate of inflation. This was not done here in order to maintain simplicity in the model.   
* 
 
Introducing heuristics in forecasting output 
Agents are assumed to use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the future output and 
inflation. The way I proceed is as follows. I start with a very simple forecasting 
heuristics and apply it to the forecasting rules of future output. I assume two types of 
forecasting rules. A first rule can be called a “fundamentalist” one. Agents estimate 
the steady state value of the output gap (which is normalized at 0) and use this to 
forecast the future output gap. (In a later extension, it will be assumed that agents do 
not know the steady state output gap with certainty and only have biased estimates of 
it). A second forecasting rule is an “extrapolative” one. This is a rule that does not 
presuppose that agents know the steady state output gap. They are agnostic about it. 
Instead, they extrapolate the previous observed output gap into the future.  
The two rules are specified as follows 
The fundamentalist rule is defined by   0
~
1   t
f
t y E      (4) 
                                                 
2 It is now standard in DSGE-models to use a pricing equation in which marginal costs enter on the 
right hand side. Such an equation is derived from profit maximisation in a world of imperfect 
competition. It can be shown that under certain conditions the aggregate supply equation (3) is 
equivalent to such a pricing equation (see Gali(2008), Smets and Wouters(2003)).  
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The extrapolative rule is defined by  1 1
~
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This kind of simple heuristic has often been used in the behavioural finance literature 
where agents are assumed to use fundamentalist and chartist rules (see Brock and 
Hommes(1997), Branch and Evans(2006), De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006)). It is 
probably the simplest possible assumption one can make about how agents, which 
experience cognitive limitations, use rules that embody limited knowledge to guide 
their behavior. In this sense they are bottom-up rules. They only require agents to use 
information they understand, and do not require them to understand the whole picture.  
Thus the specification of the heuristics in (4) and (5) should not be interpreted as a 
realistic representation of how agents forecast. Rather is it a parsimonious 
representation of a world where agents do not know the “Truth” (i.e. the underlying 
model). The use of simple rules does not mean that the agents are dumb and that they 
do not want to learn from their errors. I will specify a learning mechanism later in this 
section in which these agents continuously try to correct for their errors by switching 
from one rule to the other.  
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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and   1 , ,   t e t f       (8) 
 
where   t f ,   and   t e,    are the probabilities that agents use a fundamentalist, 
respectively, an extrapolative rule.    
A methodological issue arises here. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here 
are not derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex 
post, on the demand and supply equations. This has also been the approach in the 
learning literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja(2001). Ideally one would like 
to derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in which agents 
experience cognitive problems. Our knowledge about how to model this behaviour at 
  6the micro level and how to aggregate it is too sketchy, however, and I have not tried 
to do so
3.  
As indicated earlier, agents are rational in the sense that they continuously evaluate 
their forecast performance. I apply notions of discrete choice theory (see Anderson,  
de Palma, and  Thisse, (1992) and Brock & Hommes(1997)) in specifying the 
procedure agents follow in this evaluation process. Discrete choice theory analyzes 
how agents decide between different alternatives. The theory takes the view that 
agents are boundedly rational, i.e. utility has a deterministic component and a random 
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where Uf,t and Ue,t  are the forecast performances (utilities) of the fundamentalists and 
extrapolators, respectively. These are defined as the mean squared forecasting errors 
(MSFEs) of the optimistic and pessimistic forecasting rules; k  are geometrically 
declining weights.  
Applying discrete choice theory the probability that an agent will use the 
fundamentalist forecasting rule is given by the expression  (Anderson,  de Palma, and  
Thisse, (1992) and Brock-Hommes(1997)):  
 
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Similarly the probability that an agent will use the extrapolative forecasting rule is 
given by:  
 
t f
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    (12) 
Equation (11) says that as the past forecast performance of the fundamentalists 
improves relative to that of the extrapolators agents are more likely to select the 
fundamentalist rule about the output gap for their future forecasts. As a result the 
                                                 
3 Psychologists and brains scientists struggle to understand how our brain processes information. There 
is as yet no generally accepted model we could use to model the micro-foundations of information 
processing. There are some attempts to provide micro-foundations of models with agents experiencing 
cognitive limitations, though. See e.g. Kirman, (1992), Delli Gatti, et al.(2005).  
  7probability that agents use the fundamentalist rule increases. Equation (12) has a 
similar interpretation. The parameter γ measures the “intensity of choice”. It 
parametrizes the extent to which the deterministic component of utility determines 
actual choice. When γ = 0  utility is purely stochastic. In that case agents decide to be 
fundamentalist or extrapolator by tossing a coin and the probability to be 
fundamentalist (or extrapolator) is exactly 0.5. When γ = ∞ utility is fully 
deterministic and the probability of using a fundamentalist rule is either 1 or 0. The 
parameter γ can also be interpreted as expressing a willingness to learn from past 
performance. When γ = 0 this willingness is zero; it increases with the size of γ. 
Note that this selection mechanism is the disciplining device introduced in this model 
on the kind of rules of behaviour that are acceptable. Only those rules that pass the 
fitness test remain in place. The others are weeded out. In contrast with the 
disciplining device implicit in rational expectations models which implies that agents 
have superior cognitive capacities, we do not have to make such an assumption here.  
It should also be stressed that although individuals use simple rules in forecasting the 
future, this does not mean that they fail to learn. In fact the fitness criterion used 
should be interpreted as a learning mechanism based on “trial and error”. When 
observing that the rule they use performs less well than the alternative rule, agents are 
willing to switch to the more performing rule. Put differently, agents avoid making 
systematic mistakes by constantly being willing to learn from past mistakes and to 
change their behavior. This also ensures that the market forecasts are unbiased.  
The mechanism driving the selection of the rules introduces a self-organizing 
dynamics in the model. It is a dynamics that is beyond the capacity of any one 
individual in the model to understand. In this sense it is a bottom-up system. It 
contrasts with the mainstream macroeconomic models in which it is assumed that 
some or all agents can take a bird’s eye view and understand the whole picture. These 
agents not only understand the whole picture but also use this whole picture to decide 
about their optimal behaviour. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 




  8Introducing heuristics in forecasting inflation 
Agents also have to forecast inflation. A similar simple heuristics is used as in the 
case of output gap forecasting, with one rule that could be called a fundamentalist rule 
and the other an extrapolative rule. (See Brazier et al. (2006) for a similar setup). The 
fundamentalist rule is based on the announced inflation target, i.e. agents using this 
rule have confidence in the credibility of this rule and use it to forecast inflation. The 
extrapolative rule is used by agents who do not trust the announced inflation target. 
Instead they extrapolate inflation from the past into the future.  
The fundamentalist rule will be called an “inflation targeting” rule. It consists in using 
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The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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The same selection mechanism is used as in the case of output forecasting to 
determine the probabilities of agents trusting the inflation target and those who do not 
trust it and revert to extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.  
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where Utar,t and Uext,t are the weighted averages of past squared forecast errors of 
using targeter and extrapolator rules, respectively. These are defined in the same way 
as in (9) and (10). 
  9This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to find 
out how credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible, using 
the announced inflation target will produce good forecasts and as a result, the 
probability that agents will rely on the inflation target will be high. If on the other 
hand the inflation target does not produce good forecasts (compared to a simple 
extrapolation rule) the probability that agents will use it will be small.  
The solution of the model is found by first substituting (3) into (1) and rewriting in 
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where bold characters refer to matrices and vectors. The solution for Zt  is given by  
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t r     (21) 
 
The solution exists if the matrix A is non-singular, i.e. if (1-a2c2)a2b2c1 ≠ 0. The 
system (21) describes the solution for yt and t given the forecasts of yt and t . The 
latter have been specified in equations (4) to (12) and can be substituted into (21). 
Finally, the solution for rt  is found by substituting yt and t obtained from (21) into 
(3).  
My research strategy consists in comparing the dynamics of this behavioural model 
with the same structural model (aggregate demand equation (1), aggregate supply 
equation (2) and Taylor rule equation (3)) under rational expectations which we 
interpret as a stylized DSGE-model.   
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This model can be solved under rational expectations using the Binder-Pesaran(1996) 
procedure.  
2.2 Calibrating the model  
I proceed by calibrating the model. In appendix A  the parameters used in the 
calibration exercise are presented. The model was calibrated in such a way that the 
time units can be considered to be months. A sensitivity analysis of the main results to 
changes in the some of the parameters of the model will be presented. The three 
shocks (demand shocks, supply shocks and interest rate shocks) are i.i.d. with 
standard deviations of 0.5%. 
 
3. Animal spirits, learning and forgetfulness 
In this section simulations of the behavioural model in the time domain are presented 
and interpreted. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the time pattern of output 
produced by the behavioural model. A strong cyclical movement in the output gap can 
be observed. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows a variable called “animal spirits”
4. It 
represents the evolution of the fractions of the agents who extrapolate a positive 
output gap. Thus when the curve reaches +1 all agents are extrapolating a positive 
output gap; when the curve reaches 0 no agents are extrapolating a positive output 
gap. In fact in that case they all extrapolate a negative output gap. Thus the curve 
shows the degree of optimism and pessimism of agents who make forecasts of the 
output gap.  
Combining the information of the two panels in figure 1 it can be seen that the model 
generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. During some periods 
optimists (i.e. agents who extrapolate positive output gaps) dominate and this 
translates into above average output growth. These optimistic periods are followed by 
pessimistic ones when pessimists (i.e. agents who extrapolate negative output gaps) 
dominate and the growth rate of output is below average. These waves of optimism 
 
4 See Mario Nuti (2009)on the different interpretations of “Animal Spirits”. The locus classicus is 
Keynes(1936). See also Farmer(2006) and the recent book of Akerlof and Shiller(2009). 
  11and pessimism are essentially unpredictable. Other realizations of the shocks produce 
different cycles with the same general characteristics.  
These endogenously generated cycles in output are made possible by a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that can be described as follows. A series of random shocks creates the 
possibility that one of the two forecasting rules, say the extrapolating one, delivers a 
higher payoff, i.e. a lower mean squared forecast error (MSFE). This attracts agents 
that were using the fundamentalist rule. If the successful extrapolation happens to be a 
positive extrapolation, more agents will start extrapolating the positive output gap. 
The “contagion-effect” leads to an increasing use of the optimistic extrapolation of the 
output-gap, which in turn stimulates aggregate demand. Optimism is therefore self-
fulfilling. A boom is created. At some point, negative stochastic shocks and/or the 
reaction of the central bank through the Taylor rule make a dent in the MSFE of the 
optimistic forecasts. Fundamentalist forecasts may become attractive again, but it is 
equally possible that pessimistic extrapolation becomes attractive and therefore 
fashionable again. The economy turns around.   
These waves of optimism and pessimism can be understood to be searching (learning) 
mechanisms of agents who do not fully understand the underlying model but are 
continuously searching for the truth. An essential characteristic of this searching 
mechanism is that it leads to systematic correlation in beliefs (e.g. optimistic 
extrapolations or pessimistic extrapolations). This systematic correlation is at the core 
of the booms and busts created in the model. Note, however, that when computed 
over a significantly large period of time the average error in the forecasting goes to 
zero. In this sense, the forecast bias tends to disappear asymptotically. 
The results concerning the time path of inflation are shown in figure 2. First 
concentrate on the lower panel of figure 2. This shows the fraction of agents using the 
extrapolator heuristics, i.e. the agents who do not trust the inflation target of the 
central bank. One can identify two regimes. There is a regime in which the fraction of 
extrapolators fluctuates around 50% which also implies that the fraction of forecasters 
using the inflation target as their guide (the “inflation targeters”) is around 50%. This 
is sufficient to maintain the rate of inflation within a narrow band of approximately + 
and – 1% around the central bank’s inflation target. There is a second regime though 
which occurs when the extrapolators are dominant. During this regime the rate of 
inflation fluctuates significantly more. Thus the inflation targeting of the central bank 
  12is fragile. It can be undermined when forecasters decide that relying on past inflation 
movements produces better forecast performances than relying on the central bank’s 
inflation target. This can occur quite unpredictably as a result of stochastic shocks in 
supply and/or demand. We will return to the question of how the central can reduce 
this loss of credibility. 
  
 













The simulations reported in the previous section assumed a given set of numerical 
values of the parameters of the model. It was found that for this set of parameter 
values animal spirits (measured by the movements in the fraction of optimistic 
extrapolators) emerge and affect the fluctuations of the output gap. The correlation 
coefficient between the fraction of optimists and the output gap in the simulation 
reported in figure 1 is 0.86. One would like to know how this correlation evolves 
when one changes the parameter values of the model. I concentrate on two parameter 
values here, the intensity of choice parameter, , and the memory agents have when 
calculating the performance of their forecasting. The latter is represented by the 
parameter k  in equations (9)-(10) and is a series of declining weights attached to 
past forecast errors. I define     (and 
k
k    ) 1 (   1 0    ). The parameter  can 
  14then be interpreted as a measure of the memory of agents. When    = 0 there is no 
memory; i.e. only last period’s performance matters in evaluating a forecasting rule; 
when   = 1 there is infinite memory, i.e. all past errors, however far in the past, 
obtain the same weight.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in figure 3. The left hand panel shows 
the correlation between the output gap and the fraction of optimistic extrapolators 
(animal spirits) for increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter, . It can be 
seen that when  is zero (i.e. the switching mechanism is purely stochastic), this 
correlation is zero. The interpretation is that in an environment in which agents decide 
purely randomly, i.e. they do not react to the performance of their forecasting rule, 
there are no systematic waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) that can 
influence the business cycle. When  increases, the correlation increases sharply. Thus 
in an environment in which agents learn from their mistakes, animal spirits arise. 
Thus one needs a minimum level of rationality (in the sense of a willingness to learn) 
for animal spirits to emerge and to influence the business cycle. It appears from figure 
3 that this is achieved with relatively low levels of γ.  
The right hand panel shows the correlation between the output gap and the fraction of 
optimists for increasing values of the memory parameter  . It can be seen that   
when  = 1 the correlation is zero. This is the case where agents attach the same 
weight to all past observations, however, far in the past they occur. Put differently, 
when agents have infinite memory; they forget nothing. In that case animal spirits do 
not occur. Thus one needs some forgetfulness (which is a cognitive limitation) to 
produce animal spirits. Note that the degree of forgetfulness does not have to be large. 
For values of  below 0.98 the correlations between output and animal spirits are 
quite high. 
Having presented the main features of the behavioural (bottom up) model I now 
proceed to show how this model leads to a view of macroeconomic dynamics that 
contrasts greatly with the view obtained from the rational expectations (top down) 
macroeconomic models . I concentrate on three areas. The first one has to do with the 
business cycle theories implicit in the behavioural and the rational expectations 
models. The second one focuses on the nature of the uncertainty in the two models 
and the third one on the implications for monetary policies.   





4. Two different business cycle theories 
 
The behavioural and rational expectations macroeconomic models lead to very 
different views on the nature of business cycle. Business cycle movements in the 
rational expectations (DSGE) models arise as a result of exogenous shocks (in 
productivity and preferences) and lags in the transmission of these shocks to output 
and inflation. Thus inertia in output and inflation are the result of the lagged 
transmission of exogenous shocks. One could call the inertia (and the business cycles) 
introduced in the DSGE-model exogenously created phenomena
5.  
In contrast, the behavioural model presented here is capable of generating inertia (and 
business cycles) without imposing lags in the transmission process. This could be 
called endogenous inertia. I show this by presenting simulations of output and animal 
spirits in the absence of lags in the transmission process in the demand and the supply 
equations. This is achieved by setting the parameters of the forward looking variables 
a1 = 1 in equation (1) and b1 = 1 in equation (2). The results are shown in figure 4. We 
observe similar business cycle movements in output that are highly correlated to 
                                                 
5 In a way it can be said that the lags in the transmission mechanism introduce an exogenous, 
some may say an ad-hoc, element into the logic of the DSGE-model. To give an example, 
Calvo pricing in which firms are constrained to adjust prices instantaneously (Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (2001)) is routinely imposed in DSGE models. It is clear, however, 
that such a restriction comes from outside the logic of the model. In a world where everybody 
understands the model and each other’s rationality, which is at the core of the DSGE-models, 
agents would want to go immediately to the optimal plan using the optimal price.  They 
would not want to accept such a restriction.   
 
  16animal spirits as in figure 1. The correlation between output and animal spirits now is 
0.71, which is somewhat lower than when lags in the transmission process were 
assumed (figure 1). This correlation, however, remains significant and is the main 





The inertia obtained in the behavioural model could also be called informational 
inertia. In contrast to the rational expectations model, agents in the behavioural model 
experience an informational problem. They do not fully understand the nature of the 
shock nor its transmission. They try to understand it by applying a trial and error 
learning rule, but they never succeed in fully understanding the complexity of the 
world. This cognitive problem then creates the inertia in output and prices. Thus one 
obtains very different theories of the business cycles in the two models
6 
                                                 
6 Critics of the heuristic model presented here may argue that the comparison between the rational and 
the behavioural model is unfair for the rational model. Indeed the heuristic model generates inertia 
because the evaluation and selection process of the different heuristics is backward looking. This is the 
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The different natures of the business cycles in the DSGE-models and the behavioural 
model also have policy implications. In the DSGE-models now favoured by central 
banks, business cycle movements in output and prices originate from price and wage 
stickiness. In order to reduce this kind of volatility more flexibility in prices and 
wages  is required. That is why many central banks call for more flexibility. In a more 
flexible world, central banks will not be called upon so often to stabilize output, and 
thereby set price stability at risk. 
In the behavioural model, business cycle movements in output arise from 
informational inertia. Thus, even if prices and wages become more flexible, this will 
not necessarily reduce the business cycle movements in output. As a result, society’s 
desire to stabilize output will not be reduced. And central banks that inevitably 
respond to these desires will face the need to stabilize output at the risk of reducing 
price stability.  
 
 
5. The nature of uncertainty in the two models 
 
The behavioural and the rational expectations models produce a different view about 
the nature of uncertainty. We illustrate this feature by presenting impulse responses to 
shocks. Here I focus on the impulse responses to an interest rate shock, defined as 
plus one standard deviation of the shock in the Taylor equation.  
The peculiarity of the behavioural model is that for the same parameters of the model 
the impulse responses are different for each realization of the stochastic shocks. This 
contrasts with the rational expectations model where the impulse response functions 
are not sensitive to the realization of the stochastic shocks (keeping the parameters 
unchanged).  
Figure 5 shows the mean impulse responses to an interest rate shock. These were 
constructed by simulating the model 10,000 times with 10,000 different realizations 
                                                                                                                                            
reason why the behavioural model does not need lags in the transmission process to generate inertia. 
However, it can be argued  that this evaluation and selection process can only be backward looking, 
and as a result, the lags that are present in the behavioural model are within the logic of that model. 
This contrasts with the lags introduced in the rational model: they come from outside the model. See 
Milani(2007b) who makes a similar point contrasting rational expectations models with learning 
models.  
 
  18of the shocks. The mean and median responses together with the standard deviations 
were then computed. Figure 5 shows the mean and median response (the dotted lines 
are + and – 2 standard deviations from the mean response), exhibiting the standard 
result of an interest rate shock on output and inflation. However, the uncertainty 
surrounding this result is considerable at least in the short run. This contrasts with the 
rational expectations model which does not show such uncertainty (see figure 6). 
Where does this uncertainty come from? Not from parameter uncertainty. The same 
parameters are used in constructing all our impulse responses. The answer is that in 
this behavioural model each realization of the shocks creates different waves of 
optimism and pessimism (animal spirits). One could also call these “market 
sentiments”. Thus a shock that occurs in one simulation happens in a different market 
sentiment than the same shock in another simulation. In addition, the shock itself 
affects market sentiments. As a result, the short-term effects of the same interest rate 
shock become very hard to predict.  
Another way to interpret this result is to say that the timing of the shock is important. 
The same shocks applied at different times can have very different short-term effects 
on inflation and output. In other words, history matters. Note that the uncertainty 
about the impulse responses tends to disappear in the long run, as the effect of short-
term differences in market sentiments disappears.    
The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that the nature of the uncertainty in 
the two models is very different. In the top down structure of the rational expectations 
models, agents capable of overseeing the whole picture, compute with great precision 
how these shocks are transmitted. The question that arises here is whether the 
precision obtained in this model does not create an illusion among the practitioners of 











Note: The dotted lines represent the impulse responses with +/- 2 standard deviations 
 
  Figure 6: Impulse responses to interest rate shock in rational model 
 
 
  20  The contrast with the behavioural model is great. The bottom up structure of this  
model is one in which agents have only limited information. These agents with 
limited and heterogeneous information, follow rules of behaviour that when 
interacting with other rules lead to great complexity and a great amount of uncertainty 
about how an interest rate shock is transmitted. In fact our results suggest that even if 
one knows the parameters of the model with certainty, it will not be possible to 
predict how a given shock in the interest rate applied at a particular time will be 
transmitted in the economy. 
 
6. The nature of uncertainty: some further results.  
In this section I discuss some further results illustrating the nature of the uncertainty 
in the behavioral model. I ask the question of how the transmission of the interest rate 
shock is influenced by the market sentiments (animal spirits). The way I proceed is as 
follows. From the impulse response function I extract the short-term output and 
inflation responses to the interest rate shock. I define short-term to mean after five 
periods.  Then I computed the mean animal spirits index (as defined in section 3 and 
figure 1) during the periods up to period 5 after the interest rate shock. I repeat this 
exercise  500 times. This yields 500 observations of the short-term response and the 
mean animal spirits that prevailed up to the period when I measure the short-term 
response. The results are shown in figures 7 and 8. On the horizontal axis the animal 
spirits index is shown. As before it varies between 0 and 1. When the index is zero all 
agents are extrapolating a negative output gap, i.e. pessimism is at the highest level. 
When the index is one alls agents extrapolate a positive output gap. Optimism is at its 
peak. When the index is equal to 0.5 few agents are in fact extrapolating, and most are 
following a fundamentalists rule, i.e. they expect the output gap to return to zero (its 
steady state value. On the vertical axis of figure 7 the short-term output effect of an 
interest rate increase is shown; on the vertical axis of figure 8 the short-term inflation 
effect of an interest rate increase is shown. I have expressed these effects as 
“multipliers”, i.e. I devide the output and inflation effects by the interest rate shock 
(which is one standard deviation of the error term in the Taylor equation).  
The results of figures 7 and 8 lend themselves to the following interpretation. First, 
animal spirits have a strong impact on the short-term output effect of the same interest 
  21rate shock. In general, I find that the stronger the animal spirits, i.e. the stronger 
optimism and pessimism are, the greater is the short term impact of the interest rate 
shock on output.   In contrast, when animal spirits are weak (the index is close to 0.5) 
the impact is weakest. Thus, when the market is dominated by either optimism or 
pessimism, the monetary authorities’ interest rate instrument has the greatest impact 
on output (in the short run). These effects, however, tend to disappear in the long run.  
Second, the animal spirits have a much lower impact on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy to move inflation. This is made clear from figure 7, which shows a low 











  227. Animal Spirits: theory and empirics 
The concept of animal spirits, i.e. waves of optimism and pessimism, has played a 
central role in the behavioural macroeconomic model presented in the previous 
sections. Is there an empirical counterpart for this concept? There is one, and it is 
widely used in day-to-day macroeconomic analysis. Many countries use survey based 
consumer and/or business sentiment indicators as a tool of analyzing the business 
cycle and as a predictive instrument.  
The best-known sentiment indicator in the US is the Michigan Consumer Confidence 
indicator which has been in use since the 1950s. The first measures of consumer 
confidence were developed by George Katona in the late 1940s (see Katona(1951)). Since 
then similar indicators have been implemented in a large number of countries (see 
Curtin(2007) for an evaluation).  Typically, sentiment indicators are constructed on the 
basis of a number of questions of how the individual perceives the present and the future 
economic conditions. Thus, these surveys produce two indices, one concerning present 
conditions, and one about future economic conditions. I will concentrate on the latter 
here, because this comes closest to the concept of optimism and pessimism used in this 
paper, which is forward looking. The structure of these questions usually presents the 
individual with a discrete choice between good-bad-neutral. An example from the 
Michigan indicator is the question: “Do you think that during the next twelve months, 
we’ll have good times financially or bad times or what? [good times/uncertain/bad 
times]”. The answers are then transformed into an index by computing the divergence 
between “good times” and “bad times” answers.  
The question that is addressed in this section is to what extent these sentiment 
indicators behave in a way that is consistent with our behavioural macroeconomic 
model. In figure 12 the Michigan Consumer Confidence indicator is shown, together 
with the growth rate of US GDP (quarterly data) during 1980-2009. The correlated 
movements of the sentiment index and the growth rates of GDP are striking. The 
correlation coefficient was found to be 0.56. Note that in the simulations reported in 
the previous sections the correlation coefficient between the output gap and the 
fraction of optimists was typically around 0.85. The lower correlation observed in 
reality is related to the fact that the survey based sentiment indicators have a lot of 
noise. Also in figure 8 the consumer sentiment is compared to the growth of GDP, 
while in the theory sentiments and realizations relate to the same variable, output gap. 
  23In both cases, though, there is a similar pattern of contemporaneous correlation 
between sentiments and observed economic growth.  
A typical feature of this correlation in the theoretical model is that the causality goes 
both ways, i.e. animal spirits affect output and output feeds back on animal spirits. We 
illustrated this by performing a Granger causality test on the simulated output gaps 
and the fractions of optimists (see table 2). It showed that one cannot reject the 
hypotheses that animal spirits Granger cause the output gap and that the output gap 
Granger causes the animal spirits. Can one find the same structure in the relation 
between the observed GDP growth rates and the Michigan Consumer Confidence 
indicator? The answer is provided in table 3. It shows that one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the Michigan Consumer Confidence indicator Granger causes US 
GDP. The reverse is less clear-cut: there is some evidence that GDP Granger causes 
the Michigan Confidence indicator, but the level of significance is a borderline case. 
Curtin(2007) has shown that in a sample of more than 50 countries in a majority of 
these countries one finds two-way causality between the confidence indicator and 
GDP growth (or another proxy for the business cycle).  
Figure 8 
































































































































































































































































































































































Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and University 
of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Index.  
 
  24Table 4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  MICHIGAN does not Granger Cause GDP  118   11.2085   0.001 
  GDP does not Granger Cause MICHIGAN   2.33769   0.129 
 
8. Conclusion 
Macroeconomic models based on rational expectations assume extraordinary 
cognitive capabilities of individual agents. The latter are assumed to be capable of 
understanding the whole picture. This feature makes them top-down models. Recent 
developments in other disciplines including psychology and brain science document 
that individual agents struggle with limited cognitive abilities, restricting their 
capacity to understand the world. As a result, individual agents use small bits of 
information and simple rules to guide their behaviour.  
I have used these new insights to develop a macroeconomic model in which the 
cognitive limitations of agents take center stage. I have called this a bottom-up model. 
Once one moves into a world of cognitive limitations one faces the problem that 
agents use simple and biased rules to forecast output and inflation. In order to provide 
discipline in the use of these rules a learning mechanism was introduced that allows 
for the selection of those rules that are more profitable than others. This learning 
mechanism ensures that although agents use biased rules the market forecasts are 
unbiased. 
The ensuing behavioural model produces a number of results that distinguishes it 
from the rational expectations models. First, the behavioural model creates 
correlations in beliefs which in turn generate waves of optimism and pessimism. The 
latter produce endogenous cycles which are akin to the Keynesian animal spirits. 
These animal spirits are found to become more important when agents are willing to 
learn from the errors produced by biased beliefs. But, at the same time, there must be 
some forgetfulness about errors made long ago for animal spirits to emerge and to 
influence the business cycle.  
Second, the bottom-up behavioural model produces a degree of uncertainty about the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks that is different from the uncertainty obtained 
  25in rational expectations (DSGE) -models. In the latter linear models, uncertainty about 
the effects of monetary policy shocks arises only because of the lack of precision in 
the estimation of the structural parameters of the model. In the behavioural model 
there is an additional dimension to uncertainty. This is that the same policy shock can 
have different effects depending on the state of the economy, including the degree of 
optimism and pessimism agents have about the future. As a result, the transmission of 
policy shocks depends on the timing of these shocks. This is an insight not found in 
mainstream top-down models. In fact these models produce results whose precision is 
made possible because some agents are assumed to have unlimited cognitive abilities. 
Models with such features carry the risk of luring economists in believing that the 
transmission of shocks can be predicted with great confidence. 
Finally, the behavioural model provides for a very different theory of the business 
cycle as compared to the business cycle theory implicit in the rational expectations 
(DSGE) models. In the DSGE-models, business cycle movements in output and prices 
arise because rational agents cannot adjust their optimal plans instantaneously after an 
exogenous disturbance. Price and wage stickiness prevent such instantaneous 
adjustment. As a result, these exogenous shocks produce inertia and business cycle 
movements.   
In contrast to the rational expectations model, agents in the behavioural model 
experience an informational problem. They do not fully understand the nature of the 
shock nor its transmission. They use a trial and error learning process aimed at 
distilling information. This cognitive problem then creates the inertia in output and 
prices. Thus a very different theory of the business cycles is obtained.   
These differences also have policy implications. In order to reduce output volatility in 
the DSGE-models more flexibility in prices and wages is required. That is why many 
central banks call for more flexibility of wages and prices. In a more flexible world, 
central banks will not be called upon so often to stabilize output, and thereby set price 
stability at risk. 
In the behavioural model, business cycle movements in output arise from 
informational inertia. Thus, even if prices and wages become more flexible, this will 
not necessarily reduce the business cycle movements in output. As a result, society’s 
  26desire to stabilize output will not be reduced. And central banks that inevitably 
respond to these desires will face the need to stabilize output.   
The behavioural model proposed in this paper can be criticised for being “ad-hoc”. 
There is no doubt that the model has ad-hoc features, i.e. assumptions that cannot be 
grounded on some deeper principle, and therefore have to be taken for granted. In 
defence of this “ad-hocquerie”, the following should be stressed. Once we leave the 
comfortable world of agents who experience no limits to their cognitive abilities, ad-
hoc assumptions are inevitable. This is due to the fact that we do not fully 
comprehend the way individuals with cognitive limitations process information. In 
contrast, there is no secret in how the superbly informed individuals in the rational 
expectations top down world process information. They understand the model, and 
therefore there is only one way to write down how they form their expectations. This 
feature may give the model builder intellectual satisfaction, but it is unclear whether 
such a model is useful to understand a world in which agents’ cognitive capacities are 
severely restricted.   
In addition, the current DSGE-models have attached many ad-hoc features aimed at 
improving the empirical fit which they fail to produce without these additions. All 
these ad-hoc additions (Calvo-pricing and other ad-hoc lags, rule of thumb 
consumers) constitute departures from rational behaviour. As a result, it is unclear 
how much of the dynamics of these models is produced by these ad-hoc additions 
rather than by the micro-founded rational behaviour.  
The research presented in this paper should be considered to be preliminary. 
Although, some empirical evidence was provided suggesting that the behavioural 
macroeconomic model has some plausibility, a more rigorous empirical evaluation of 
the model will be necessary. In order to be convincing as an alternative modeling 
strategy, the predictions of the model will have to be confronted more systematically 
with the data. In addition, although remains relatively small in this paper. Thus 
necessitates to broaden the menu of possible rules so that the selection of the “fittest” 
rules can occur using a wider pool of rules.  
 
 
  27References: 
 
Adjemian, S., Darracq Pariès, M., Moyen, S., (2007), Optimal Monetary Policy in an 
Estimated DSGE-Model for the Euro Area, Working Paper, no. 803, European 
Central Bank. 
Akerlof, G., and Shiller, R., (2009), Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives 
the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University 
Press, 230pp.  
Anagnostopoulos, A., Licandro, O., Bove, I., Schlag, K., (2007), An evolutionary 
theory of inflation inertia, Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 
433-443.  
    Anderson, S., de Palma, A., Thisse, J.-F., 1992, Discrete Choice Theory of Product 
Differentiation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Anufriev, M;, Assenza, T., Hommes, C., Massaro, D., (2009), Interest Rate Rules and 
Macroeconomic Stability under Heterogeneous Expectations, CeNDEF, 
University of Amsterdam.  
Binder, M., and M.H. Pesaran, (1996), Multivariate Rational Expectations Models 
and Macroeconomic Modeling: A Review and Some Results, in M.H. Pesaran 
and M. Wickens, eds.,  Handbook of Applied Econometrics: Macroeconomics. 
Branch, W., and Evans, G., (2006), Intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation, 
Journal of Economic theory, 127, 264-95.  
Branch, W., and Evans, G. (2009), Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous 
Expectations, mimeo, Stanford University.  
Brazier, A., Harrison, R., King, M., and Yates, T;, (2006),  The danger of inflating 
expectations of macroeconomic stability: heuristic switching in an overlapping 
generations monetary model,  Working Paper no. 303, Bank of England,  
August.  
Brock, W., and Hommes, C., 1997, A Rational Route to Randomness, Econometrica, 
65, 1059-1095 
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., Prelec, D., (2005), Neuroeconomics: How 
neurosciencecan inform economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 63(1), 9-
64. 
Chari, V., Kehoe, P., McGrattan, E., (2009), New Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful 
for Policy Analysis, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1:1, p. 
242-266. 
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C., (2001), Nominal Rigidities and the 
Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, NBER Working Paper, no. 
8403, July.  
Christiano, L., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., (2007), Shocks, Structures or Monetary 
Policies, Working Paper, no. 774, European Central Bank. 
Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler, M., (1999), The Science of Monetary Policy, A New 
Keynesian Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661-1707.  
  28Curtin, R., (2007), Consumer Sentiment Surveys: Worldwide Review and 
Assessment, Journal of Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis, 1-37  
De Grauwe, P., and Grimaldi, M., (2006), The Exchange Rate in a Behavioural 
Finance Framework, Princeton University Press.   
Della Vigna, S., (2007, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, NBER 
Working Paper, no. 13420.  
Delli Gatti, D., Di Guilmi, C;, Gaffeo, E., Giuloni, G., Gallegati, M., Palestrini, A., 
(2005), A new approach to business fluctuations: heterogenous interacting 
agents, scaling laws and financial fragility, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 56, 489-512 
De Long, J., Bradford, B., Schleiffer and Summers, L., 1990, "Noise Trader Risk in 
Financial Markets", Journal of Political Economy. 
Estrella, A., and Furher, J., Dynamic Inconsistencies: Counterfactual Implications of a 
Class of Rational Expectations Models, American Economic Review, 92(4), 
Sept., 1013-1028.  
Evans, G., and Honkapohja, S., 2001, Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics, 
Princeton University Press, 421pp.  
Farmer, Roger, E.A., (2006), Animal Spirits, Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.   
Galí, J., López-Salido, D., Vallés, J., (2004), Rule of Thumb Consumers and the 
Design of Interest Rate Rules, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 36, no. 
4, 739-764.  
Galí, J., (2008), Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle, Princeton 
University Press, 203pp. 
Gaspar, V., Smets, F., Vestin, D., (2006), Adaptive Learning, Persistence and Optimal 
Monetary Policy, Working Paper Series, no. 644, European Central Bank. 
Gigerenzer, G., and P.M. Todd.1999. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Goodhart, C., (2007), The Continuing Muddles of Monetary Theory: A Steadfast 
Refusal to Face Facts,(mimeo), Financial Markets Group, London School of 
Economics  
Hayek, F., (1945), The Use of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review, 
XXXV, no. 4, 519-530..  
Howitt, P., (2008), Macroeconomics with Intelligent Autonomous Agents, In 
Macroeconomics in the Small and the Large: Essays on Microfoundations, 
Macroeconomic Applications and Economic History in Honor of Axel 
Leijonhufvud, edited by Roger Farmer. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A., 1973, Prospect Theory: An analysis of decisions 
under risk, Econometrica, 47, 313-327  
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A., 2000, Choices, Values and Frames, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Kahneman, D., 2002, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive 
Judgment and Choice,  Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, Stockholm  
  29Kahneman, D., and Thaler, R., 2006, Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 221-234 
Katona, George. 1951. Psychological analysis of economic behavior. New York: 
McGraw-Hill 
Keynes, J. M. (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
MacMillan and Co.  
Kirman, A., (1993), Ants, Rationality and Recruitment, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 108: 137-156.  
LeBaron,B., and Tesfatsion, L., (2008), "Modeling Macroeconomies as Open-Ended 
Dynamic Systems of Interacting Agents", American Economic Review (Papers 
& Proceedings), Volume 98, No. 2,  pp. 246-250 
Leijonhufvud, A., (1993), Towards a Not-Too-Rational Macroeconomics, Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 1, no. 1, July. 
Ludvigson, S., (2004), Consumer Confidence and Consumer Spending, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 18:2, Spring  
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis (2002). “Sticky Information versus Sticky 
Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 117 (4), 1295-1328.  
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis (2006) “Pervasive Stickiness.” American 
Economic Review, 96 (2), 164-169..  
Milani, F., (2007a), Learning and Time-Varying Macroeconomic Volatility, mimeo, 
University of California, Irvine. 
Milani, F., (2007b), Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence,  Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 54, 2065-2082. 
Nelson, E., (1998), Sluggish Inflation and Optimizing Models of the Business Cycle, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 42(2), Oct., 303-322.   
Orphanides, A., and Williams, J., (2004), Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect 
Information, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
Sargent, T. 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. Oxford University Press. 
Sims, C., (2005), Rational Inattention: A Research Agenda, Discussion Paper, no. 
34/2005, Deutsche Bundesbank.  
Smets, F. and Wouters, R., (2003), An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Model, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 1123-
1175.  
Smets, F., and Wouters, R., (2007), Shocks and Frictions in Us Business Cycles, 
Working Paper, no. 722, European Central Bank. 
Stanovich, K., and West, R., 2000, Individual differences in reasoning: Implications 
for the rationality debate, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645--665.  
Svensson, L., (1997), Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring 
Inflation Targets, European Economic Review, 41: 111-46.  
 
  30Tesfatsion, L;, (2006), Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive 
Approach to Economic Theory, pp. 831-880 in Leigh Tesfatsion and Kenneth 
L. Judd (eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 2: Agent-
Based Computational Economics, Handbooks in Economics Series, North-
Holland/Elsevier, the Netherlands, Spring 2006. 
Thaler, R., 1994, Quasi Rational Economics, Russell Sage Foundation, New York. 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., 1981, The framing of decisions and the psychology 
of choice, Science, 211, 453-458.  
Walsh, C., (2003), Monetary Theory and Policy, MIT-Press, 612 pp. 
Woodford, M., (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary 
Policy, Princeton University Press.  
Woodford, M., (2009), Convergence in Macroeconomics: Elements of the New 
Synthesis, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, no. 1, 
January, 267-97.  
 
  31  32




pstar = 0;          % the central bank's inflation target 
a1 = 0.5;         %coefficient of expected output in output equation 
a2 = -0.2;       %a is the interest elasticity of output demand 
b1 = 0.5;        %b1 is coefficient of expected inflation in inflation equation 
b2 = 0.05;       %b2 is coefficient of output in inflation equation 
c1 = 1.5;       %c1 is coefficient of inflation in Taylor equation 
c2 = 0.5;       %c2 is coefficient of output in Taylor equation 
c3 = 0.5;       %interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 
 = 1;                %fixed divergence in beliefs 
 = 2;      % variable component in divergence of beliefs 
gamma = 1;        %intensity of choice parameter 
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